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CHANGING DOD’S ANALYSIS PARADIGM
 War gaming and military modeling have a well-documented history cover-ing over two centuries, a period that coincides with the inception and 
evolution of formal professional development for military officers�1 The term war 
game used here refers to “a warfare model or simulation that does not involve the 
operations of actual forces, in which the flow of events affects and is affected by 
decisions made during the course of those events by players representing oppos-
ing sides�”2
Beginning with the early-nineteenth-century Prussian creation of war colleges 
to augment operational experience, professional 
military education involved a combination of the 
study of history and international law, the study of 
theorists who had written on the nature of war and 
strategy, practical exercises, and theoretical analy-
sis as the means for understanding and developing 
military art and science� Carl von Clausewitz’s On 
War and Antoine-Henri de Jomini’s The Art of 
War competed for attention� Whereas Clausewitz 
treated war as a social phenomenon, rooted in the 
age of reason, Jomini believed in the existence of 
immutable principles of warfare, akin to Newto-
nian mechanics�
As war gaming became a routine part of Prus-
sian military education, the Prussians attempted 
to create rigid rules for calculating the outcomes 
of engagements� Major powers around the world 
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believed that war gaming contributed notably to the Prussians’ success in 1866 
and 1870� However, as the popularity of war gaming spread following the Prus-
sian victories, semirigid and free-form adjudication based on the game director’s 
judgment became more popular�3
War colleges used war gaming as a basis for both practical exercises and 
theoretical analyses� Both war colleges and military staffs used war gaming to 
develop strategy� In addition, in the early twentieth century, quantitative mili-
tary modeling outside of war gaming was adopted more widely� New techniques 
were formulated, such as Lanchester equations, which Frederick W� Lanchester 
published in 1916�4
During World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom instituted 
operations evaluation groups, consisting of scientists, to quantify the outcomes 
of military practices and seek improvements� These groups observed operations, 
collected data, and created models of military operations analogous to the models 
they used in scientific endeavors� Following World War II, the U�S� government 
established federal contract research centers to continue this practice in peace-
time�5 The Navy transformed its Operations Research Group into an Operations 
Evaluation Group that became the Center for Naval Analyses� The Air Force es-
tablished RAND� The Army established its Operations Research Office at Johns 
Hopkins University, which became the Research Analysis Corporation� The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) founded a Weapons Systems Evaluation Group that 
became the Institute for Defense Analyses�6 Initially these organizations provided 
mechanisms for contracting university professors; eventually, they developed 
permanent staffs�
In the long-term competition with the Soviets, the emphasis shifted from 
operations research to systems analysis: operations research focuses on analyz-
ing operations to support commanders; systems analysis focuses on supporting 
the Pentagon’s policy and procurement bureaucracies by attempting to quantify 
the effects of proposed platforms and weapons systems employing advancing 
technology� An expansion of the practice of quantification to optimize opera-
tions spread from the military to industry, leading to the creation of operations 
research as a discipline�
In 1961, coming from Ford Motor Company, Secretary of Defense Robert S� 
McNamara established the Pentagon’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 
System and a Systems Analysis Office to oversee the selection of military systems 
and force allocation and determine how much was enough to invest in defense�7 
Alain C� Enthoven founded the Systems Analysis Office on well-intentioned te-
nets�8 However, competing interests and divisions in staff responsibilities within 
and among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the 
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services and the need to align analytical processes with Pentagon staff procedures 
and budget cycles resulted in these tenets never being followed fully�
Computers rapidly expanded the scale of problems addressed in the 1960s and 
’70s� Computer-based campaign simulations that strung together and iterated 
sets of equations modeling combat became the primary method the Pentagon 
procurement bureaucracy used to undergird arguments for selecting one military 
platform or technology over another� As the Department of Defense (DoD) ex-
panded its use of contractors to conduct analyses in the 1970s, a sizable industry 
emerged to support and embed Pentagon analytical practices� “Unfortunately, the 
trend over the last decades has been for DoD studies to become more focused 
on standard scenarios and big [computer] models�”9 On 8 May 2015, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert O� Work and Vice Chief of the JCS Admiral James A� 
Winnefeld Jr� called for initiatives to renew war gaming within DoD�10
Scientific methods form the foundation for operations research� A frequent 
criticism of war gaming is that it is less scientific, and thus less useful for predic-
tion, than computer-based combat/campaign simulation� This article examines 
war gaming and combat/campaign simulations against scientific standards to 
explore their usefulness and limitations and how they complement each other� 
Computer-based campaign simulation involves much larger uncertainties and 
indeterminacy than generally realized� Both campaign simulation and war gam-
ing require the use of additional analytical techniques to validate and extend their 
findings�
Operations research is rooted in an interactive cycle of observing fleet/field 
operations, collecting data, modeling, collecting more data, proposing changes, 
then cycling through those results again� The original operations research groups 
involved interdisciplinary teams of scientists employing models and paradigms 
from their respective disciplines to understand military operations well enough 
to predict effects� DoD needs to overhaul its current analysis paradigm and its 
focus on individual major defense acquisition programs, weaning itself off large, 
computer-based campaign models� It should adopt analysis campaigns and cycles 
of research to meet growing security challenges within limited budgets�11
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
The System and Its States
Bernard O� Koopman begins his study of the logical basis of combat simulation 
with the following:
Basic to any scientific examination of nature is the concept of the system: the set  
of interacting things considered� In a military action, the system is the totality of 
men[/women] and weapons involved, together with their environment: the medium 
in which the action occurs and which affects its course� And equally fundamental is 
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the concept of the set of states that the system can be in, just one at any given time� � � � 
In each case, the state of the system includes its physical state: positions and velocities 
of the units, condition of armaments, data-gathering status, and all the meteorologi-
cal specifications� But how far into the mental state of the commanders must one 
go in defining the “state” of the system? This can only be settled by asking a second 
question, that of the evolution of the state of the system with the passage of time.
Classical physics has traditionally considered that the state of a system is only ad-
equately described if, once the state is given, all later states are determined: Given any 
two similar systems in the same initial states, all their later states will be the same— 
provided that their environmental influences (external forces) continue the same� 
Thus, in Newtonian mechanics, the full and exact knowledge of the positions and 
velocities of the parts of a material system determine its whole future motion� But it is 
only in the simplest military operations that such an order of determinateness exists�
In far more cases, it is not feasible to specify the state of a system so that its subse-
quent evolution is determined� What is far more common is to have only statistical 
determinateness: in a large number of similar systems starting in the same state, the 
same proportion will go into any given later state�12
The premise of combat/campaign simulation is that the evolution of the states 
in some future combat can be determined adequately statistically� In war gam-
ing, the state of the system evolves move to move through adjudication of player 
decisions� Keeping in mind the concept of states helps us consider the scope and 
limits of computer-based combat/campaign simulation and war gaming�
Scientific Standards
“Standards of scientific excellence, though they may occasionally be self- 
defeating, on the whole and in the long run make for success�”13 However, one 
must stipulate carefully what one intends when posing scientific standards, lest 
they become straitjackets� “The emphasis by historians and philosophers of sci-
ence is that there is no such thing as the scientific method� The more realistic 
danger is that some preferred set of techniques will become identified with sci-
entific method as such�”14
As systems analysis took hold in DoD, those seeking to determine “how much 
is enough” sought to create models using equations that allowed quantitative 
comparisons to predict the costs and benefits of alternative systems� As com-
puters became more powerful, DoD turned to quantitative combat/campaign 
simulations as a basis for major decisions, regarding them as more objective, 
rigorous, and useful than less-formal analytical techniques, such as war gaming� 
Such simulations were considered to be
• more objective, in the sense that computer models would support major 
decisions based on explicit criteria of national interest, not on compromises 
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among institutional forces, and provide open and explicit analysis (including 
transparent data and assumptions) available to all parties
• more rigorous, in the sense that computers would provide quantitative an-
swers to support choices among explicit, balanced, feasible alternatives and 
allow reproducible runs for comparing alternatives
• more useful, in the sense that computers would allow more systematic analy-
sis to predict the effects of decisions15
Therefore, objectivity, rigor, and usefulness provide the set of scientific stan-
dards used in this examination of combat/campaign simulation and war gaming�
Objectivity. “That is objective which insists on its own rights regardless of our 
wishes, and only experience can transmit its claims to us� Experience is ultimate 
because it confronts us with a continuous ultimatum� For a man to by-pass expe-
rience in the pursuit of truth is to make himself God� � � � The subjectivist lives in 
a fool’s paradise�”16
Objectivity equates to “the intersubjectivity of findings independent of any 
one person’s intuitive judgment�”17 Demanding intersubjectivity requires that 
“a scientific observation could have been made by any observer” and “testifies 
that the observation is uncontaminated by any factors save those common to all 
observers�”18 “For an enterprise to be characterized as scientific it must have as its 
purpose the explanation and prediction of phenomena within its subject-matter 
domain and it must provide such explanation and prediction in a reasoned, and 
therefore intersubjective, fashion� � � � While precise predictions are � � � preferred 
to vague ones, a discipline which provides predictions of a less precise character, 
but makes them correctly and in a systematic and reasoned way, must be classi-
fied as a science�”19
Concepts lead to observations, which then lead to theories and laws� Laws 
have counterfactual force, carry explanatory force, and support prediction� They 
serve as standpoints from which we can survey for exceptions� They provide the 
basis for broader theories that advance the understanding of complicated and 
complex phenomena� A definition of an expert is one who knows what context 
must hold for a law to apply�20
Basic Newtonian physics involves laws strictly determining the relationships 
between actions and their effects� But even physics requires statistical laws to 
explain quantum phenomena, thermodynamics, etc�, and cannot predict the 
behavior of many multibody problems and other chaotic systems� Statistical 
laws permit probabilistic explanations for phenomena involving statistical in-
determinacy�21 Similarly, systems involving human behavior admit quasi laws or 
tendency laws�22 “In order for the [quasi] law to be valid, it is not necessary that 
no apparent exceptions occur, it is only necessary that, if an apparent exception 
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should occur, an adequate explanation should be forthcoming�”23 Statements 
such as “fear, honor, and self-interest are the fundamental causes of war” qualify 
as quasi laws�
Both war gaming and combat/campaign simulations are pseudoexperiments: 
experiments carried out on a model instead of in reality�24 The person or team 
designing the experiment reduces a substantive problem to a conceptual model 
on the basis of the perception of what is relevant to the problem� This conceptual 
model is a world, defined as the object or system about which a person is con-
cerned� A state of the world is a description leaving no relevant aspect undefined� 
A true state of the world is a state that does in fact obtain, i�e�, the true description 
of the world�25 The conceptual model is reduced further to physical and semantic 
(quantitative and relational) models, each equating to a theory of behavior of 
the subject matter, employed in the analysis to determine the true state�26 If the 
experiment serves its purpose, this system of models produces an outcome that 
can be generalized by induction to advance a substantive conclusion�27
The character of military (and civil) operations involves both “an evolving phys-
ical system, and � � � an unfolding set of plans, intentions, reasoning and counter- 
reasoning of the men [and women] engaged in the action, the commanders�”28
War gaming addresses the plans, intentions, reasoning, and counterreason-
ing of the roles represented in the game� It highlights “predictions regarding the 
behavior of human organizations inasmuch as the latter can be simulated most 
effectively by having experts play the roles of certain members of such organiza-
tions and act out what in their judgment would be the actions, in the situation 
simulated, of their real-life counterparts�”29 Outcomes result from the interacting 
decisions and actions of the role players, as adjudicated by game umpires and 
game-control oversight�
Epistemologically speaking, the use of an expert as an objective indicator � � � amounts 
to considering the expert’s predictive pronouncement as an integral, intrinsic part 
of the subject matter, and treating his[/her] reliability as part of the theory about the 
subject matter�30 Our information about the expert is conjoined to our other knowl-
edge about the field, and we proceed with the application of precisely the same induc-
tive methods which we would apply in cases where no use of expertise is made� Our 
“data” are supplemented by the expert’s � � � valuations and by his[/her] judgments of 
relevance � � � , and our “theory” is supplemented by the performance of experts�
In this manner the incorporation of expert judgment into the structure of our inves-
tigation is made subject to the same safeguards which are used to assure objectivity 
in other scientific investigations� The use of expertise is therefore no retreat from 
objectivity or reversion to a reliance on subjective taste�31
Computer-based combat/campaign simulations focus on physical aspects 
of combat� Human decisions are present and have a substantial impact on the 
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output, but are embedded in the simulation construction and the choice of inputs 
(data and models) rather than the decisions of combatants� To encompass human 
decision in statistical determinateness, one might turn to doctrine or, absent clear 
doctrine or future systems, query commanders for their expert opinions regard-
ing decisions they would make given each possible state of the system� To be 
practical, this approach requires a world with few states� One also might assume 
that each commander is attempting to do maximum harm and seeks a course of 
action to minimize the harm to his/her forces, using the minimax convention 
of game theory�32 “A more general method of this sort is for each commander to 
maximize his[/her] own value function—not necessarily the negative of his[/her] 
opponent’s�”33 This approach to combat/campaign simulation assumes that once 
the statistics of human decision are incorporated into the model, what remains 
is the statistically determinate evolution of the military system� But separating 
the human from the physical model often leads to erroneous conclusions� Barry 
Watts’s research indicates that, rather than having been let down by their radars 
and missiles, 80–90 percent of the pilots shot down in Vietnam and Korea never 
saw their attackers until it was too late to react�34
By virtue of the statistical determinateness, the basic process is stochastic� 
That is, there is a definite probability—the transition probability—that if the 
system is in state x at time t it will be in state xʹ at time tʹ� “Evidently, if the values 
of the transition probabilities a(x, t; xʹ, tʹ) were all known, the probabilities of every 
outcome of the battle would be known—and this for every assumed starting state” 
(italics in original)� Thus, the whole problem of the quantitative study of military 
operations is that of finding the transition probabilities from knowledge that 
can reasonably be obtained� “[A]ll the standard analytical models, Monte Carlo 
simulations, etc�, fit into this scheme�”35 Clearly, one also must have knowledge of 
the transition rates to specify at which time tʹ the new state xʹ obtains�36
In practice, analyzing stochastic processes also employs the Markovian as-
sumption, which holds that, faced with the same state, the transition probabilities 
for the system remain constant throughout the process� In the context of human 
decision, this means that no learning from previous states, no history, affects the 
process�
Of course, when methods of computer simulation are made in the usual way they 
depend for their validity on the Markov property, but when this does not apply � � � 
the numerical results, however realistic they may appear, are without logical basis—at 
least until they are proved to give an acceptable degree of approximation� The act 
of simplifying and still retaining the Markovian character—as well as operational 
realism—is an art as well as a science� Success is more apt to be achieved by limiting 
the objective of the study to the answer of a precise question rather than a diffuse 
multitude�37
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In summary: to assume that such a use of machines gives even approximately 
valid information about the military operation is to assume the following: 
• The human uncertainties have been removed�
• The combat situation involves a system that is, at any time, in an objectively 
describable state (presumes transition probabilities and rates are known)�
• The situation’s state transitions are Markovian�
• Its stochastic equations can be satisfactorily approximated by difference 
equations without losing their Markovian character�
• The repetition of runs gives, by the law of large numbers, satisfactorily ac-
curate and reliable values of the desired probabilities�38
At this point, the number of states involved in a combat simulation is worth 
considering�39 Consider an engagement involving m units on the Blue side and n 
units on the Red side�40 Indicate that a Blue unit has engaged a Red unit by draw-
ing a blue line between the two units� Similarly, use a red line for a Red unit en-
gaging a Blue unit� “The resulting colored graph indicates the state of our system� 
How many different graphs are possible? Of the mn possible ways of drawing the 
blue lines, any one can actually be drawn or not� Hence, there are 2mn possibilities 
for the blue lines; and similarly for the red� Consequently, there are 22mn possible 
colored graphs�”41 See the accompanying figure for a depiction of the case for a 
combined-arms rock-paper-scissors contest in which all “units” could engage 
simultaneously or in any order� The number of states of this world for a single 
battle is 218� If we consider whether each engagement is successful, we double the 
number of states to 236� Each additional consideration enlarges the exponent for 
computing the state space�
We can perform a mind experiment to estimate how large the state space 
would be for a battle that a “perfect” parallel computer the size of the universe, 
given the time of the universe, might compute� In this parallel computer, the 
processors are as small as protons, they operate at the speed of light, and they 
are packed densely into the volume of our universe� Each processor is assigned a 
distinct engagement to calculate, can compute the outcome instantaneously, and 
can fetch a new engagement in 10–23 seconds, an approximation of the time it 
takes light to go the diameter of a proton� Given 1045 processors per cubic meter, 
1081 cubic meters in the universe, 1023 calculations per second, and 10 seconds as 
an epoch a bit longer than the age of the universe, this computer could perform 
10168 calculations, or about 2558�42 If 4mn = 558 and we examine the same number 
of force elements on both sides, this “perfect” computer could calculate the states 
for an engagement with just less than twelve force units per side� Note that this 
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formulation of the engagement does not consider the timing of engagements, 
which would vastly increase the possible states of the “world.”
Although simulations such as those of one-on-one air or naval combat might 
be reduced to a computable number of states, force-on-force combat and cam-
paign simulations quickly exceed the number of states that admit of brute-force 
computation. So, how are these simulations implemented? By using a combina-
tion of shortcuts (heuristics) and clever analysis. These heuristics are essentially 
quasi laws whose application requires the contribution of experts who under-
stand well the scope of those laws’ applicability. Combat/campaign simulations 
often use expected-value models to determine what would happen “on average,” 
rather than Monte Carlo simulations. Increasing the number of runs does not 
increase statistical prediction by the law of large numbers in these simulations, 
as the expected value provides a determined outcome for each run. Lanchester 
equations—developed to help predict the outcome of naval and land battles—
most often use expected values, but can employ Monte Carlo techniques.43 Vary-
ing the exponent used in Lanchester equations between square and linear laws es-
sentially reflects the command and control and operational concept employed in 
the engagement. The complexity of ground models results in heuristic techniques 
such as weighted effectiveness indices / weighted unit values or qualitative judg-
ment models to calculate engagement outcomes. All these approaches involve 
subjective judgments and the insights of the analyst/team developing and using 
the model. In a combat/campaign simulation, the analyst/team must use subjec-








m Blue-force elements n Red-force elements
# of states considering successful and 
unsuccessful engagements = 24mn = 236
Source: Koopman, ”A Study of the Logical Basis of Combat Simulation,” pp. 871–72.
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supplement missing data, and create models that have not been validated in 
actual operations or exercises�
The works of Wayne P� Hughes, Glenn A� Kent, Bernard O� Koopman, and 
Paul K� Davis, among others, suggest clever approaches to overcoming computa-
tional limitations of brute-force calculations and appropriate forms of analysis�44 
With the development of complexity sciences, computers came to be used to 
simulate cognitive and other processes, rather than to solve equations� As Deep 
Blue and AlphaGo have demonstrated, in games of finite size with well-specified 
rules, computers can use artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to top human 
performance�45 However, current DoD computer-based campaign simulations 
use brute-force calculations� They have yet to incorporate agent-based models, 
automatons, fitness landscapes, genetic algorithms, or other techniques from 
complexity science� RAND incorporated some AI techniques into campaign 
simulations in the 1980s, but DoD chose not to employ those features in the 
simulations it adopted, instead staying with the types of deterministic and sto-
chastic models Koopman addressed�46
So, how do we assess objectivity, given the logics of combat/computer simula-
tion and war gaming?
Guidelines for the practice of operations research, although written with mili-
tary modeling in mind, apply equally to war gaming and to combat/campaign 
simulation�47 Significant distinctions between good operations research practice 
and other scientific inquiry include a presumption of the existence of a client 
(sponsor) and the complications presented by security classification and pro-
prietary work� Close cooperation with the client in framing the analysis is good 
practice common to any technique of analysis�
In war gaming, a design and development team develops the scenario and 
reference materials (e�g�, commander’s intent, task organization, subordinates’ 
missions, orders of battle, unit locations, weather) to establish the world and its 
initial state and develop prebriefings to immerse players into the game� The team 
identifies the number of competing sides, the scope of disciplines required, the 
command echelons represented, the bureaucratic verisimilitude desired, and the 
number and expertise of role players needed to accomplish the game objectives� 
Team members also design the information conditions: the information available 
to each side and its flow, the communications techniques and their verisimilitude 
to accustomed formats, the physical arrangements, the move structure, and the 
game rate to arrive at a desired culmination point�48 To facilitate decision making, 
they construct move forms and provide for feedback among the participants� For 
adjudication, they select methods and models (quantitative and qualitative) used 
to change the world state resulting from each game move, and the qualifications 
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and organization of game controllers and umpires� They also anticipate control 
inputs of plausible events (usually wild cards, such as rogue actions or accidents 
to initiate conflict) to shape player decisions to achieve game objectives�49
Combat/campaign simulations similarly frame the world for the purpose of 
the pseudoexperiment and provide input data to establish its initial state� Where-
as war-game design involves detailed considerations of context for role-player 
decisions—with particular attention to information conditions (who knows what 
and acts when), as discussed above—combat/campaign simulations remove hu-
man decision� Information conditions are embedded in the combat models� The 
models selected incorporate a theory of command and control and the concept 
of operations in their code—consciously or not� The analysts / team members 
develop or choose models and techniques they judge appropriate to the study, 
on the basis of their expertise� “A fundamental truth in analysis is that scenarios 
drive the answers� Thus, much effort should go into conceiving and tuning the 
scenarios used and specifying uncertainty ranges� This should be a deeply ana-
lytic affair rather than the result merely of creative people spinning stories that 
raise interesting issues�”50 Whereas game scenarios are necessarily rich, to provide 
the context essential for expert role playing, the world of the combat/campaign 
simulation employs sparse scenarios, with only the data needed to perform the 
calculations�
In war gaming, a control team and umpires run the simulation� They execute 
the game design, adjudicating changes in the “true” state of the world using the 
decisions of the role players, their quantitative models, and their judgments, 
taking into account the game’s objectives� In computer-based combat/campaign 
simulations, the computer computes the state transitions and the analyst decides 
what constitutes a stopping point or state for ending the computer run� Both war 
gaming and combat/campaign simulation also involve analysts who observe, re-
cord, analyze, and report on the pseudoexperiments� Costs and time available to 
design, develop, and run the simulation and subsequent analysis constrain both 
types of simulation�
Both war games and combat/campaign simulations involve clients, designers, 
developers, and analysts employing informal reasoning processes and subjective 
judgment in creating their theory of the world under study� The totality of the 
participants, models, and data employed in these simulations and the relation-
ships among them represent the theory of the war game or combat/campaign 
simulation� In the case of games, this includes the role players, umpires, and 
control team, in addition to any quantitative models used in adjudication� In 
combat/campaign simulation, it involves the treatment of human decision and 
the concepts and information conditions embedded in the models, as well as the 
flow of outcomes from one process into the next (e�g�, who attacked whom first)� 
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The motivations, expertise, tastes, beliefs, and reliability of all human partici-
pants involved in the pseudoexperiment are thus integral, intrinsic parts of the 
subject matter, and therefore parts of the theory expressed in the war game or 
combat/campaign simulation�
Given the subjective judgment involved in defining the world and assessing its 
true state in both forms of pseudoexperimentation, objectivity comes from inter-
subjectivity� For combat/campaign models, this involves techniques such as the 
use of models that have shown value in actual combat (e�g�, those developed using 
combat data in war) or that have been verified in field/fleet exercises employ-
ing actual forces� A weaker, but essential, form of verification for assessing the 
objectivity of scenarios, models, and data is to open them to debate and review— 
realizing that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”51—while recognizing the pitfalls 
that may result from political logrolling� Interpreting the structure of relation-
ships in and among models and how to sequence these models in pseudoexperi-
ments relies on the subjective judgment of the developers� It also requires devel-
opers who know what factors are indeed relevant to the world under study; e�g�, 
attacking air forces on the ground can be a way to gain dominance of the air�52
Operational experience is useful in developing the expertise to make such judg-
ments� Gaming has an advantage in this regard: “In operational gaming, the sim-
ulated environment is particularly effective in reminding the expert, in his[/her] 
role as a player, to take all the factors into account � � � that are potentially rel-
evant; for if he[/she] does not, and chooses a tactic or strategy which overlooks 
an essential factor, an astute ‘opponent’ will soon enough teach him[/her] not to 
make such an omission again�”53 “People sensitive to a variety of responsibilities 
collaborate, applying the criteria that are relevant to their own interests, making 
estimates that reflect their own kinds of knowledge, and putting themselves in 
a mood to worry about probabilities rather than just a list of possibilities� They 
really live through a simulated crisis and not only learn things about their plans 
and their predictions but learn something about the nature of crisis�”54
Gaming allows all participants—role players, control team, umpires—the right 
of reclama when they need additional information for a decision or question the 
adjudication of a move� Manual games are particularly useful in this regard� In 
manual games (which may employ computer calculation in adjudication), players 
must make decisions from one turn to the next, taking into account the current 
situation; and procedures used to evaluate the consequences of the players’ deci-
sions must be quite clear to the players—simple enough for them to understand�55
Gaming achieves objectivity by allowing all experts involved to share both 
their formal and informal reasoning explicitly and openly� Deficits in knowledge 
and both consensus and dispute are evident, thus providing a foundation for 
further inquiry� Critiques provide ways to improve the games continually� By 
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   75 12/15/16   1:53 PM
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/5
 7 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
contrast, the details of combat/campaign simulations are evident only to the 
analyst/team that developed the simulation or to someone willing to conduct a 
detailed study of the data and models used in the simulation�
In all science, good practice calls for independent review� However, in this 
field the practice is difficult to follow owing to the additional costs and the limi-
tations that security and proprietary concerns impose� Clients often use “need to 
know” as an excuse to hold details of the pseudoexperiments close� Often, when a 
contractor performs the analysis, the details of the pseudoexperiment are propri-
etary� The Operations Research Society of America promulgated “Guidelines for 
the Practice of Operations Research” as a consequence of a dispute in testimony 
to Congress over two studies of ballistic-missile defense that supported conflict-
ing recommendations� The guidelines conclude as follows:
The analyst, as analyst, must restrict his[/her] analysis to the quantifiable and logi-
cally structural aspects of the problem only� In complex problems, perhaps the most 
valuable thing the analyst can do is to point out to his[/her] client that there are 
uncertainties deriving from such factors as:
 • Lack of agreement on means of evaluating the worth of complex systems�
 • Uncertainty about the technical capabilities and costs of systems yet unbuilt�
 • Uncertainty about environmental and operational factors that influence  
performance�
 • Uncertainty about the future capabilities or intentions of possible opposition� 
The analyst should be prepared to engage in dialogue with the client and other advi-
sors to consider how other value systems, assumptions, and conditions might influ-
ence conclusions� � � � The analyst’s job, especially in tough policy questions,  
is to analyze and help illuminate, and this means having the qualities of humility  
and openness necessary to participate in open dialogue with the client and other 
advisors�56
Subjective judgment enters once more in deciding what actions to take as a 
result of the war game or combat/campaign simulation� Here again, gaming has 
an advantage in that those who will decide what actions to take (or those on their 
staffs) have participated in the experiment—the decision makers learn directly 
from the game experience� In contrast, in the case of a combat/campaign simula-
tion, decisions on actions to take depend on how the analyst/team used subjective 
judgment to frame and report the results, adding another layer of interpretation 
to the decision process�
A critique of games is that the subjective judgments of the experts involved 
make them irreproducible� A question for combat/campaign simulation is 
whether, given the same subject matter, independent teams would select the same 
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scenarios, models, data, structures, and relationships, among them producing the 
same results and the same analysis on the basis of those results� A 1973 General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report following promulgation of the Operations Re-
search Society of America’s “Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Research” 
found shortfalls in independent checks to ensure the accuracy, timeliness, con-
sistency, and overall quality of the data—about 18 percent of the models were 
considered generally transferable for use by another person or another site—and 
“[t]he choices of scenarios, equipment performance, and personnel operations 
are based somewhat upon unknowns and uncertainties� The extent that the 
model reflects the real-world situation depends on the accuracy of the model-
builders’ judgment�”57
Relying on intersubjectivity generates concerns centering on the role of bias 
in forming belief� Critiques of limitations on human judgment and decision are 
legion� Irving L� Janis and Leon Mann provide a framework for how people make 
decisions (unconflicted adherence, unconflicted change, defensive avoidance, 
hypervigilance—as with a crowd heading for the exits in an emergency—and 
vigilance)�58 Even vigilant decision making may be subject to cognitive, egocen-
tric (self-serving motives), or affiliative (organizational or social acceptability) 
constraints�59 Charles Pierce provides a set of methods for fixing belief similar to 
those above, including tenacity (such as a child hears from its mother), authority 
(the will of an institution), apriority (the adoption of self-evident assumptions 
that are clear to the user, but to no one else), and finally the method of science�60 
Humans are exceptionally poor at assessing subjective probabilities�61 “When we 
pit [political] experts against minimalist performance benchmarks—dilettantes, 
dart-throwing chimps, and assorted extrapolation algorithms—we find few signs 
that expertise translates into greater ability to make either ‘well-calibrated’ or 
‘discriminating’ forecasts�”62 Humans make decisions on the basis of their tastes 
(preferences) and beliefs (subjective probabilities)�63 They persist in even dis-
credited beliefs� The Central Intelligence Agency provides four reasons for this 
persistence: “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive; mind sets tend to 
be quick to form but resistant to change; new information is assimilated to exist-
ing images; and initial exposure to blurred or ambiguous stimuli interferes with 
accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available�”64
However, “[w]hether a distortion common to all can nevertheless be said to 
yield something objective is a philosophical question that has no bearing on the 
conduct of the human enterprise of science� The methodological question is 
always limited to whether what is reported as an observation can be used in sub-
sequent inquiry even if the particular observer is no longer part of the context�”65
Thus, for objectivity, the analytical team / rapporteurs in war gaming should 
note the assumptions and design choices that went into the game, arguments 
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both for and against a particular course of action by teams making their deci-
sions, and what outcome the team hoped to achieve, capturing both consensus 
and disputes� Objectivity in combat/campaign simulation involves using models 
validated by observation of operations or field/fleet exercises, employing data 
collected from those exercises� Studies done in advance of actual operations 
should be compared with what transpired and why�66 Analysts of both war games 
and combat/campaign simulations should keep in mind the motivations and 
beliefs of the participants and should extract from the experiment that which 
subsequent inquiry could verify or refute�
Rigor. Aristotle said, “A well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of 
precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits�”
Kaplan goes on to note, “Another failing of models—more accurately, of model 
builders—consists in an undue emphasis on exactness and rigor�”67 Used in this 
way, rigor too often is equated to precise quantification, usually in the form of 
increasing the number of significant figures relative to a decimal point� However, 
the tests of rigor are whether (1) the analytical techniques used are appropriate to 
the subject matter, (2) we can articulate clearly the details of the method used and 
how we arrived at conclusions, and ultimately (3) we can state what valid lessons 
the study produced� Employing analytical techniques that provide overly exact 
answers that do not reflect the uncertainties and indeterminacy inherent in the 
subject matter are not rigorous�
Rigor is related closely to objectivity� It demands careful attention to the de-
sign of a war game or combat/campaign simulation to achieve the objectivity 
described above� It also requires efforts to understand the quality of data used in 
quantitative models, estimating the range of uncertainty in quantitative results, 
and framing conclusions in quasi law–like statements that reflect the consensus 
and disagreement of those involved in the pseudoexperiment� New understand-
ings of chaos and complexity also raise questions regarding the treatment of hu-
man action in combat simulations�
A first test of rigor is the data used in quantitative and semantic modeling� The 
most reliable data are collected during operations or exercises that are essentially 
the same as those represented in the model� Operations research originated dur-
ing World War II with the collection of data, then the use of those data to develop 
models of the operation under study�68 Many of those models and the modeling 
techniques have persisted, but sustained efforts to collect data at sea or in the field 
are now rare� The 1973 GAO study found that in 85 percent of the cases submit-
ted to the researchers, DoD activities used data obtained from sources other than 
field exercises or actual experience�69
Beginning with its World War II experience involving malfunctioning tor-
pedoes, the U�S� submarine force began collecting data on every torpedo fired� 
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When tasked with creating an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability in 1949, 
Submarine Development Group 2 developed a process of designing exercises to 
test technology and tactics, collecting data on system and platform (including 
crew) performance during those exercises, using the submarine approach and at-
tack manual to standardize the data, and reconstructing the exercises to quantify 
the results�70 Using this process, the submarine force went from having essentially 
no ASW capability in 1949 to having the world’s premier ASW capability in 1969� 
The process led to continual improvement of the search and combat models used 
in war games and combat/campaign simulations� At-sea exercises discovered 
and corrected errors in search models implemented on computers�71 The Navy 
used a similar approach in its Tactical Development and Evaluation Program and 
some equipment-development programs in the 1970s and ’80s�72 However, oddly 
enough—given accelerating demands for data—as computer simulation became 
more popular in the Pentagon for platform and weapon systems analysis (what 
DoD calls program analysis), emphasis on prototyping equipment and collect-
ing data on processes and performance at sea and in the field waned� Structured 
operational testing and evaluation for systems in development largely replaced 
mission-oriented operations analysis involving all aspects of the system’s use and 
its effectiveness as one of a suite of systems�
Recent efforts to return to the roots of operations research have encountered 
difficulties� During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, initiatives to put analytical teams 
into the field were severely limited by commanders’ concerns about protecting 
the analysts—and controlling the data� Although we have been fighting in that 
region for a decade and a half, data on processes and performance from the field 
have not been the source for modeling and experimentation that they were in 
World War II�
The majority of friendly-force data used in computer-based combat/campaign 
simulation come from structured operational testing and evaluation of system 
performance (which may or may not reflect its performance in actual field/
fleet use, with different concepts of employment) or from expectations of future 
system performance based on key performance parameters used for design� 
However, data from structured tests have not proved reliable� In World War II, 
“experimental results overestimated the casualty production rate for tanks by a 
factor of two; for artillery duels by a factor of three; and for pure infantry actions 
by a factor of seven�” 73 Given the human penchant for survival and the fog and 
friction of war, structured tests provide overly optimistic estimates�
Lest you think we are better off now with modern computers and powerful algo-
rithms built into our best models, here is a more recent example� The U�S� Navy 
depends mightily for defense of the fleet on the Aegis missile system� Using data from 
controlled experiments at sea, one may calculate that if you shoot two missiles at an 
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incoming missile and they are operationally and statistically independent of each oth-
er, and if you also add some point defense, you can expect to shoot down 90 percent 
or more of the attacking anti-ship cruise missiles� What is the combat record? First, 
in battles at sea warships of other states have averaged around 75 percent success in 
defending themselves� On the other hand, all of their success must be attributed to 
soft kill and point defense weapons, not to surface-to-air missiles [SAMs]� Second, 
there are several instances of warships that might have defended themselves but did 
not, illustrated by the recent successful missile attack on the Israeli missile ship Hanit� 
Navy analysts will also remember the Exocet hits on the defendable USS Stark and 
HMS Sheffield� Third, in the entire record of over 220 missiles fired on ships at sea 
starting in 1967, only one anti-ship missile has been shot down by a SAM�74
Models predicted the United States would incur thirty thousand casualties in 
Operation DESERT STORM, not the roughly three hundred that actually occurred; 
and half of those casualties did not occur in battle�75 Models for casualty estimates 
almost never include friendly fire� Even when friendly-force data are available 
in a combat model, factors such as the reliability and effectiveness of allied and 
adversary weapons, the proficiency of an adversary in using counterfire or coun-
termeasures that depend on the adversary’s training, etc�, must be estimated� Key 
data disputes “often center around order of battle, unit effectiveness, munitions 
quantities, chemical warfare performance degrade values, advance rates, sortie 
rates, and concepts of operation [CONOPS]� More time is spent instantiating and 
refining CONOPS information than systems performance data� Hence the obvi-
ous utility of wargames to understand CONOPS and the flow of the warfight�”76
In World War II, the operations evaluation groups determined that a simple 
estimate of the error in a model is the individual percentage error of the data times 
the square root of the number of data elements� For a model with five thousand 
data entries and a tight error range of 10 percent, this equates to a factor of sev-
en�77 The 1973 GAO report found that 27 percent of the models they examined 
had over ten thousand coded instructions� Campaign models that DoD currently 
uses typically have on the order of one hundred thousand data elements and 
hundreds of equations and semantic models establishing the relationships among 
the data elements� Mistakes in the internal validity of computer models resulting 
from treating continuous functions as discrete and stipulating relationships for 
which no theory or data exist to allow computation compound the errors in the 
final calculation�78 Adding detail to a combat/campaign simulation may or may 
not improve the rigor, but it surely will increase the uncertainty of the calculation�
Understanding this principle, the members of the World War II Operations 
Evaluation Group used a hemibel (half a decibel, or a factor of about three) 
rule� If they could not demonstrate factor-of-three improvements in a recom-
mended change, they were uncertain that they had sufficient accuracy to merit 
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the recommendation, particularly considering the time and costs involved in 
changing operational practices� At a recent Military Operations Research Society 
workshop, a section leader informed me that military operations research no 
longer uses the hemibel rule� Why not is unclear�
The use of combat models to adjudicate war games is subject to the same 
concerns as is their use in campaign simulations� However, employing models 
that participants can question and umpires can explain adds both objectivity and 
rigor to the enterprise�
Whereas combat/campaign simulation requires the analyst/team to repre-
sent all indeterminacy as statistical, war gaming specifically addresses strategic 
and structural indeterminacy� Strategic indeterminacy means that the outcome 
largely is determined by the interaction of role-player decisions and the adjudica-
tion of control/umpires (who may be considered additional actors)� Structural in-
determinacy involves uncertainties in appropriately bounding the subject under 
study, determining which elements are relevant to include in characterizing the 
state of the world, and understanding the relationships among those elements� 
Manual games are good for the following:
• study of partially understood dynamic processes
• study of partially understood force interactions
• building of players’ backgrounds for future study and analysis
• continual game improvement on the basis of players’ criticisms79
Where the fundamental character of the subject under study involves strategic 
and structural indeterminacy, war-gaming techniques are more appropriate than 
combat/campaign simulation� Adding the data and formalities needed for com-
putation detracts from, rather than adds to, rigor�
Usefulness and Value. The final criterion for science under exploration is the 
value or usefulness of the study or, in our case, the pseudoexperiment� Useful-
ness is the ability to use the experiment to take appropriate action� It presumes 
objectivity and rigor�
DoD turned to computer-based combat/campaign simulation because it de-
sired methods that could produce rapid, objective, rigorous simulations to exam-
ine contingencies involving different adversaries to predict force requirements, 
study strategic/operational concepts, and compare costs and effects of alternative 
new platforms or weapons systems� DoD found these simulations useful in pro-
viding a common basis for making comparisons on a timeline consistent with 
annual program and budget development�
However, the “method of Monte Carlo [or any other form of combat/cam-
paign simulation] has one particular value: its educative or intuition-building 
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effect on those who behold the actual performance of the process� It allows the 
results of experimental variations of certain factors of the situation to be per-
ceived in a direct and life-like way� This appearance of realism is so great that 
it has often led observers to forget that they were not in fact observing nature 
directly: a disastrous error�”80
The predictive value of a large-scale, complicated combat/campaign com-
puter simulation depends on how the analyst/team represents the results� Good, 
scientific analysis of computer-based campaign simulation can support quasi 
laws such as the identification of governing factors, but not strictly statistical or 
deterministic answers� Also, the premise that changing the characteristics of one 
system while leaving the rest of the world the same can determine an outcome 
assumes no feedback between the change and the rest of the system (e�g�, that 
a change in combat capability will not influence commanders’ decisions and 
CONOPS)� However, DoD’s use of computer-based simulation seeks to predict 
outcomes rather than to develop deep understanding of the factors governing the 
outcomes of battles and campaigns� Rarely do reports address governing factors 
or attempt to quantify the uncertainties inherent in the simulation�81
When DoD clients are facing a decision, telling them that their simulation 
identified topics that require future study is rarely what they want to hear� How-
ever, failure to identify unresolved issues from the pseudoexperiment obfuscates 
important uncertainties that should be considered� Science values the so-called 
heuristic fertility of studies rich in implications for further observations, experi-
ment, or conceptualization�82
Making predictions from games presents challenges similar to making predic-
tions from combat/campaign simulations, with the added proviso that although 
there is widespread skepticism about accepting any prediction of human behavior 
—much less quantified predictions—from a game, predictions derived from 
computer models are widely accepted� Yet although experts making stand-alone 
predictions are unreliable, “[e]xperience has shown that people often tend to 
adopt the same solutions to similar problems� Insofar as this is true, a realistic war 
game may predict the future, or at least some aspects of it[,] quite accurately�”83 
Where games have preceded military battles and campaigns, they have dem-
onstrated value in anticipating adversary tactics and courses of action and the 
many governing factors needed to prosecute battles and campaigns successfully� 
Examples include the following:
• Naval War College (NWC) games anticipating tactics in the Russo-Japanese 
War
• battle of Tannenberg gaming by both the Russian and German general staffs
• German general staff gaming of the Schlieffen Plan before World War I
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• gaming different strategic approaches for a war with Japan at the College 
between the world wars
• Japanese gaming of the battle of Midway
• NWC gaming of the naval mining campaign against the Japanese in World 
War II
• German and Russian general staffs gaming the German invasion of Russia 
(Operation BARBAROSSA) in World War II
• Israelis’ gaming before their operations
• U�S� Joint Staff gaming in anticipation of North Vietnam’s Tet offensive
In almost all these cases, the games accurately predicted factors driving the 
success of future operations� However, in many cases the military system was 
unable to adapt in a timely fashion or the games had no effect on the political 
leadership conducting the war� Sometimes senior military leaders rejected game 
results�84
The Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG) conducted 
a game exploring the implications of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in February 
1990, before the actual invasion in August� Although the game had Iraqi forces 
advancing into Saudi Arabia toward the oil fields, otherwise it accurately an-
ticipated a need for nontraditional coalitions, challenges in strategic lift, and the 
inadequate numbers of precision weapons on deployed Navy forces, among other 
things�85 Yet many senior officials briefed on the game in March 1990 expressed 
no interest, viewing Iran rather than Iraq as the adversary of concern� Requests 
for game documents increased as Iraq conducted the invasion�
“Gaming is a powerful method for simultaneously mastering complexity, en-
hancing communication, stimulating creativity, and contributing to consensus 
and a commitment to action�”86 Thomas C� Schelling found the following: “First, 
the games are intensely stimulating; people are very active; ideas and conjectures 
get tossed around and analysed by a highly motivated group of people; a great 
deal of expertise is collected in a single room, expertise that is not often col-
lected together; and people discover facts, ideas, possibilities, capabilities, and 
arguments that do not in any way depend on the game but nevertheless emerge 
in it�” Players discover important facts that may never have occurred to them or 
are counter to what they understood (e�g�, unprecedented acts excite attention, 
jurisdictional seams, and overlaps), and ways that players not represented in their 
usual thinking affect the feasibility and acceptability of possible courses of action� 
[T]he game, as a social and intellectual occasion, tends to be highly productive of little 
things of this sort� � � �
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Second, people � � � learn more � � � about a country, by going through a game � � �  
than by any cram course [of equivalent time]� � � � If somebody were going to be re-
sponsible for some operations in the Pacific Islands, or were going to be Deputy Chief 
of Mission in Finland, or going to run an [Agency for International Development] 
program in Cyprus, just putting him[/her] into a game for three days focused on the 
area he[/she] is going to would teach him[/her] more than he[/she] could get by any 
kind of briefings, lectures, reading program, or other program of self-improvement�
Third, acquaintance is made with people with whom one might have occasion to 
work in the future involving intense common experience in joint problem solv-
ing� These by-products are just preliminary to costs� People can spend the other 
362 days of the year pursuing other forms of analysis and learning� “All analytical 
techniques, all research methods, all stimulants to the imagination are danger-
ous� This includes games� But games are not much worse in this regard than the 
other techniques�”87
A critique of current professional military education is that it does not give 
officers a detailed appreciation of military geography in theaters of interest or of 
adversaries’ weapons systems and their concepts for using them� Theater-level 
games are valuable for learning geography, including the military geography of 
basing; the kinds and ranges of adversary and allied forces that may come into 
play and the complications they represent; and the logic of adversary concepts, 
as represented by Red teams� At the tactical level, war games are good for teach-
ing junior officers the capabilities of adversary forces in an experiential way that 
tends to stick better than reading intelligence reports�88 As the Prussian and Ger-
man militaries recognized, games are exceptionally useful for developing an ap-
preciation of command relationships and skills in writing orders and in working 
through control of forces in complicated situations�
Between the world wars, the German army (Wehrmacht) conducted field 
exercises during the summer and gamed when in garrison the rest of the year� 
During winter, each echelon, from the general staff to the company level, gamed 
their roles in the operations contemplated, then took what they gamed to the field 
the next year, beginning with company-level exercises and culminating, usually 
in August, in as large-scale an exercise as they could manage� With the army re-
stricted in size by treaty, the games aimed to teach each rank, career enlisted and 
officer, how to perform at two ranks senior so the army could expand quickly� 
During war, these games became rehearsals for upcoming operations and occa-
sionally continued as battles were being fought� The games were of great value to 
the Wehrmacht for developing concepts such as the blitzkrieg, and for developing 
its operational competence when it had sufficient forces to retain the initiative�89
The interaction of experts trying to achieve opposing aims within the context 
provided in the scenario helps ensure that relevant factors are not overlooked� 
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Games provide a basis of shared experience and a common vocabulary�90 Where-
as creativity of the analyst in combat/campaign simulation is reflected in the 
coding and analysis, the Markov assumption does not allow for learning during 
the game� Including learning algorithms (e�g�, Bayesian calculations) in the code 
further complicates analysis of the results� In war games, the role players adapt to 
each state of the world, as provided by game umpires and control� Courses of ac-
tion that do not provide desired results lead to reexamining possible approaches 
and objectives� New ideas that do work become apparent to all participants, con-
tributing to the consensus needed to generate commitment to a course of action� 
Concerns over the appearance of realism in gaming represent the same risks and 
unintended consequences as those resulting from combat/campaign modeling�91
The scope of issues amenable to war gaming exceeds that of combat/campaign 
simulation� Manual war gaming is uniquely suited to increasing our understand-
ing of and appreciation for the information dimension of warfare�92 Ultimately, 
military operations are about influence: deterring or compelling change in others’ 
actions inconsistent with one’s political aims, while reassuring and encouraging 
others’ actions that are consistent with one’s political aims� The critical feature 
of a game, as opposed to computer modeling or any other forms of one-sided 
analysis,
is that at least two separate decision centers are involved, neither of which is privy to 
the other’s planning and arguing, neither of which has complete access to the other’s 
intelligence or background information, neither of which has any direct way of know-
ing everything that the other is deciding on� � � � What this mode of organization can 
do that can not otherwise be done is to generate the phenomena of understanding 
and misunderstanding, perception and misperception, bargaining, demonstrations, 
dares and challenger’s [sic], accommodation, coercion and intimidation, conveyance 
of intent, and uncertainty about what each other has already done or decided on� � � �
� � � If I draw a face with a hidden picture there is no way for me to tell how hard it is 
to see the face except to show the picture to somebody� � � � 
It is the peculiar element of collaboration, communication, and bargaining, that is 
involved in any crisis game, that cannot be captured by “straightforward” unilateral 
analysis� � � �
� � � [I]n arguments about the treasures or dangers that one may stumble on in games 
it is significant that there is at least something that games can do or generate that can-
not be done or generated in any other way�93
Another value is that those who participate in a pseudoexperiment learn far 
more than those who receive a report of the study’s findings� Few clients have the 
time or technical ability to understand the internal details of the combat/cam-
paign simulation; they instead rely on their analytical teams to distill key findings 
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relevant to the objectives of the study� In contrast, war gaming facilitates partici-
pation by those who must make and implement decisions� Joint planning dictates 
that, ideally, “the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of the 
COAs [courses of action]” should participate in the gaming used to develop those 
COAs�94 War gaming facilitates recognition-primed decision making that allows 
commanders and their staffs to adapt rapidly to emerging situations, using their 
experiences in games “demanding careful sequential analysis of plans, decisions, 
events, and intelligence�”95
IMPLICATIONS FOR DOD ANALYSIS AND A WAY AHEAD
The principal implication of this assessment is that DoD should overhaul its 
analytical paradigm that began with the Systems Analysis Office and evolved 
with the development of computers� DoD should rely on talented analysts and 
not again make the mistake of attempting to create universal answer machines 
through standardized processes and techniques� The focus of analysis for acquisi-
tion and force development should shift from individual weapons systems to ca-
pabilities to conduct sets of missions� DoD should reinvigorate the examination 
of warfare and military operations to develop an appreciation of fundamental 
questions to focus analysis, balancing a marketplace of ideas and approaches with 
the instincts of its hierarchy to centralize planning� It then should employ analy-
sis campaigns, using cycles of research focused on top decision makers’ concerns, 
that incorporate the following:
• war gaming
• DoD’s investment in large-scale campaign models, to develop intuition and 
help identify factors governing combat outcomes
• field/fleet operations analysis
• intelligence collection
• campaign analysis
• quantitative modeling using simple, understandable models that incorporate 
only governing factors derived from observation and analysis (as opposed to 
creating computer code for each combat process and adding more code to 
already complicated models to address new technologies and phenomena)
• the study of history and recent advances in complexity sciences, and comple-
mentary analytical techniques based on advances in artificial intelligence 
and cognitive and social sciences
• review of study results against actual operations
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No new analysis paradigm can meet scientific standards without addressing 
the roadblocks created by the abuse of need-to-know strictures and proprietary 
control of analyses�
Avoiding Past Mistakes
With the recent policy to make more use of war gaming, the first principle for 
a way forward should be to avoid mistakes of the past� Efforts to use large-scale 
computer modeling to create universal answer machines were misguided� In its 
search for systematic analysis routines, the natural tendency of the Pentagon will 
be to create similar standardized systems of war gaming that would allow those 
developing procurement programs and strategists to “turn the crank” to address 
issues as they arise� However, even the most objective and rigorous efforts in the 
past have not produced the desired results, as the following examples indicate�
RAND Strategy Assessment System. In the 1980s, concerns over the ability to 
analyze a possible war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact leading to a nuclear 
exchange motivated the OSD Office of Net Assessment to sponsor RAND in de-
veloping the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS)� The approach was to 
combine the best features of war gaming and analytical modeling in a comprehen-
sive, farsighted framework for comparing views rigorously and moving toward 
some conclusions� RAND formed a stellar team to do the work, led by Paul Davis�
To this effort, war gaming provided the following: 
• the contextual richness of complete scenarios
• interaction of political and military factors
• operational constraints
• often-ignored features of real war (e�g�, unconventional attacks against 
command-and-control communications)
• asymmetries in objectives and perceptions
• asymmetries in national forces, doctrines, and styles
• relatively realistic descriptions of military campaigns
• action and reaction among the nations involved in the conflict 
Analytical modeling provided the following:
• clarity of assumptions and causality
• reproducibility
• logical structure and rigor
• efficiency, permitting many war games (multiscenario analysis)
• depersonalization, by laying issues out on paper logically96
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To make gaming more efficient and rigorous, the RSAS approach used AI 
techniques to replace human teams� To make the process transparent, the de-
sign permitted human interaction at all levels, with the exception of some core 
model and execution coding� The intent was not to eliminate the role of expert 
judgment but “to capture most of the human-expert contribution in background 
research reflected in the models�”97 Computer code was written so that analysts 
knowledgeable in the subject matter did not need to have extensive experience 
to read and program decision rules�98 The team intended that analysts and senior 
decision makers would be able to get definitive explanations and have the op-
portunity to change assumptions readily�
Departures from traditional analysis included automated game-based simu-
lation to permit multiscenario analysis, heuristic rule-based modeling to make 
explicit the key assumptions on which outcomes depend, structured military 
campaign analysis, and interactive force-operations modeling� This would enable 
the analysis to treat interrelationships among strategic and nonstrategic forces; 
cut across theater boundaries, military services, and types of warfare; and reflect 
the effects of special phenomena such as unconventional warfare and failures in 
command and control�99 The aim was not to predict outcomes but to understand 
what affected outcomes most�
In 1986, government agencies received the first installations of RSAS� An 
RSAS Steering Group, consisting of sponsors, developers, and users, approved 
requests to use the system� Although the RAND team intended that actual deci-
sion makers use the system for policy analysis, it proved too complicated to be 
of use in evaluating immediate operational situations, and high-level decision 
makers turned to their own analysts� RSAS was open to review, critique, and 
improvement� The challenge was that it was akin to an engineering library� One 
could investigate any subject, but only the developers could comprehend the 
whole system�100
As a spin-off from RSAS, RAND developed the Joint Integrated Contingency 
Model (JICM)� It designed the model to be modular for transparency and to 
avoid needing to add hundreds of thousands of input variables� “As the model 
[JICM] was used in later years, however, the optional simplicity fell into disuse as 
users focused on getting the detailed databases ‘right’ (meaning agreed upon) for 
running standardized cases�”101
Although RSAS and JICM were as objective, rigorous, and comprehensive as 
was practical, the limited interests and capacity of the DoD bureaucracy defeated 
RAND’s sophisticated efforts to meet exacting standards of science�
Joint Warfare System. In a subsequent effort to allay concerns over the services 
using their own scenarios, models, and data, in the 1990s OSD began funding 
the Joint Warfare System (JWARS) to “support multi-billion dollar resource 
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allocation decisions and critical operational planning�” JWARS was “a closed-
form analytic simulation” using deterministic and stochastic models, including 
information operations, and “high-level abstractions of sensor and communi-
cations systems, the related information flows, imperfect perception of the bat-
tlespace, and command decision making�”102 The aim, as with individual service 
campaign simulations, has been to create a simulation to determine the effects of 
varying the characteristics of a system or concept by turning a crank, leaving the 
rest of the simulation unperturbed�
Given the expansiveness of the state space, the use of models and data based 
on judgment rather than observations from operations or exercises, and the likely 
feedback among systems characteristics and concepts, this approach involves 
large uncertainties that are difficult to quantify� As Koopman stated, “Rightly 
employed, it [combat simulation] gives a useful indicator in evaluations; it can 
never be relied on to predict the future�”103 JWARS was expensive, yet could not 
accomplish the vision of those who conceived and advocated for it�
Analytic Agenda / Support to Strategic Analysis. Given the expense and chal-
lenges of JWARS, in 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald H� Rumsfeld created an 
Analytic Agenda (now called Support to Strategic Analysis—SSA) to transform 
DoD’s analysis system supporting strategic and programmatic decision making� 
The Analytic Agenda was a set of activities designed to do the following:
• Articulate, through scenarios, the secretary’s guidance to the department 
about the missions, environments, and threats for which the future force 
should be prepared�
• Apply joint concepts to future missions depicted in planning scenarios�
• Produce standardized, accessible, transparent data and common assump-
tions for department-wide use in analysis�
• Design and conduct major joint analyses to support decisions on force struc-
ture, investments, and capability trade-offs�104
This effort did result in scenarios for analysis approved by DoD leadership, 
and it created conferences at which the services met to agree on common datasets 
they would use in their analyses� Each service was assured of having one of its 
preferred scenarios included� The services also used their preferred “all-purpose” 
campaign simulations for their capability-development processes, incorporating 
data beyond that in the common datasets as needed� However, few of these data 
came from detailed analyses of operations and exercises� These efforts have had 
little impact on cross-service force structure investments or capability trade-offs�
The details of studies done using these simulations are classified and propri-
etary, limiting opportunities for review of their objectivity and rigor� OSD, the 
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Joint Staff, and the services should take care not to create a similar, highly struc-
tured set of expensive, complex, proprietary war games�
No defense problem is specified well enough that an optimum can be calculated 
without employing subjective judgment to establish values� The large campaign 
simulations used for SSA result in large sets of feasible courses of action� Expect-
ing large combat/campaign simulations or war games to resolve conflicting pref-
erences among institutional forces within the military-industrial-congressional 
enterprise that drive the defense program and budget is illogical�105 Improve-
ments to JWARS or the SSA are incapable of providing the precise predictions for 
resolving complicated and complex defense issues that those who misunderstand 
scientific rigor expect� “As one goes up the scale of complexity, the personal quali-
ties of the analyst shift from scientific to artistic and his[/her] model from precise 
to abstract� That is why asking me which model to buy is asking the wrong ques-
tion� Instead, ask me which analysts and modelers to hire�”106
Capabilities-Based Planning
DoD’s acquisition system, which consumes the vast majority of the Pentagon’s 
attention and analytical effort, focuses on major defense acquisition programs—
platforms and systems that involve the commitment of billions of dollars�107 Un-
der Secretary Rumsfeld, DoD attempted to introduce capabilities-based planning 
as a means of putting the development of individual weapons systems in context� 
Capabilities-based planning has received rough treatment in recent reviews for 
being tied to the revolution in military affairs and force transformation, focus-
ing on concepts such as net-centric warfare rather than on strategy to defeat the 
strategies and forces of identified potential adversaries� These critiques largely 
miss the mark�108
The usual driver for acquisition is that an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel is reaching 
the point where it is expensive to maintain or upgrade with new technology, and 
a military service proposes to replace that platform with a new one incorporat-
ing the latest generation of technology� A 1992 study of the cost growth of DoD 
Major Force Program categories since Secretary McNamara instituted them in 
1962 demonstrated that DoD needs 7 percent growth in its budget to maintain 
its force structure if it continues attempting to replace each platform with the 
latest generation on a one-for-one basis�109 Using the rule of 72, this means that 
a 4 percent growth in defense budgets results in halving the force roughly each 
quarter of a century�110
Following the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD made an effort to in-
stitute “strategic and tactical” acquisition reform�111 A major part of the reform 
involved pilot Evaluation of Alternatives on topics such as integrated air and mis-
sile defense as a basis for resource allocation, rather than conducting an Analysis 
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of Alternatives for each major defense acquisition program� The effort demon-
strated promise, but failed when key leaders departed� Also, weapons program 
managers wanted to know what the study would show before providing their data 
for analysis, despite direction from higher authorities�
If DoD is to overcome its accelerating mismatch between limited budgets and 
growing challenges, it requires a new analysis paradigm and a culture focused 
more on national security than on protecting parochial service and program 
priorities by withholding knowledge and data�
Asking Essential Questions and Selecting Appropriate Methods
Adoption of a new analysis paradigm will involve some time before the paradigm 
becomes institutional practice within DoD, and will incur transition costs� DoD 
should ensure that initial efforts focus on substantive issues� In the 1950s and 
’60s, federally funded research centers led the way in understanding the implica-
tions of nuclear weapons for warfare and deterrence� RAND employed Bernard 
Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas C� Schelling, Albert J� Wohlstetter, and Roberta 
M� Wohlstetter, among many other highly talented intellects, to explore funda-
mental questions of war in the nuclear age, strategy and games, and many other 
topics� Now, federally funded research and analysis centers have become princi-
pally an extension of Pentagon staff studies� Funding for independent research 
on fundamental questions has been eliminated in favor of studying the issue du 
jour, which eliminates many fundamental distinctions between federally funded 
research centers and for-profit defense contractors� In addition to making better 
use of its Office of Net Assessment, which under the leadership of the recently 
retired Andrew W� Marshall (who came to OSD from RAND in the 1970s) had a 
long history of searching for the right questions, DoD should return to the for-
mer model and mission for federally funded research centers, having them help 
DoD’s leadership understand the questions they should be asking and the issues 
they should analyze�
DoD should realize that the principal value of good analysis is in eliminat-
ing infeasible or unsuitable courses of action, and that no analyses can provide 
point solutions to complicated problems� Prevailing concepts and political power 
among those involved will determine the final trade-offs in defense policy and 
plans within the space of feasible and suitable solutions� Centralized processes 
that give too much power to one institution, such as OSD or the Joint Staff, are 
likely to generate more mistakes than a messier analytical competition among 
concepts, methods, and proposed solutions� The Secretaries of Defense must 
earn their pay�
That said, different subjects call for different analytical approaches� In turn-
ing to war gaming, DoD should avoid the law of the instrument�112 To improve 
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rigor, the Military Operations Research Society should assist DoD in developing 
guidelines for analysts to align analytical techniques with the fundamental char-
acteristics of subjects under study�
The most appropriate action from pseudoexperimentation, whether war gaming 
or combat/computer simulation, is exploring the validity of the findings using 
other techniques� Analysis campaigns involve using a variety of techniques to 
address important issues� Cycles of research emphasize the interaction among 
these techniques as progress in one investigation informs others and is in turn 
informed by them�
Learning from RSAS and decades of experience in defense analysis, Davis 
recommends analysis campaigns� “The analysis campaign should provide for 
breadth with a mix of models, human gaming, historical analysis, trend analysis, 
and collaboration with experienced operators,” and should consider multiple 
objectives� The approach is to conduct first-cut analyses to narrow the world 
under consideration, then to conduct detailed analyses� “Campaign models, for 
example—when used with large negotiated databases for only some standard 
case—are poor decision aids but are excellent for integration, for understanding 
the many facets of a successful large operation, and for building analyst expertise 
that is valuable in answering specific questions quickly, often with simpler mod-
els�”113 As an example of first-cut analysis considering multiple objectives, Hughes 
recommends examining alternative futures�
For example, in determining the best naval forces to influence China and our Asian 
allies, it is essential to remember that the same American ships and aircraft, many 
of which are built for 30 and even 40 years of combat life, must serve our interests 
whether the China-American international relationship at any given moment is 
one of cooperation, competition, crisis containment, or conflict at different levels 
of intensity� By testing our fleet’s utility in each circumstance we can judge how and 
where risks are involved with different fleet compositions and deployment patterns� 
The OSD Office of Net Assessment found that looking at alternative futures by region 
or economic circumstance was powerful� One did not make predictions about which 
future was most likely to come to pass� Instead [one] looked for common forces, solu-
tions, deployments and negotiating positions that were suited for every future�114
Scenario planning has proved an effective technique for resolving structural 
indeterminacy�115 Davis provides a comprehensive matrix of instruments (tech-
niques) assessed by important attributes to be considered in an analysis cam-
paign�116 The discussion below represents the author’s appreciation of techniques 
essential to cycles of research�
War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation. War gaming and combat/
campaign simulation are complementary to each other� Both provide insight to 
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participants on factors governing the contingency under study and issues and 
data needing further study� War games are particularly valuable for helping 
those employing DoD’s large, computer-based campaign models to understand 
CONOPS and the flow of campaigns�117
Fleet/Field Operations Analysis. Games and combat simulation should tie direct-
ly to field/fleet exercises experimenting with new concepts, using prototype sys-
tems designed to address capability enhancements, and carefully collecting data 
to inform important areas of ignorance and assumptions used in plans, games, 
and campaign simulation�
The approach and attack manual served as a basis for data collection to 
advance U�S� submarine force capabilities rapidly, as did the coordination-in-
direct-support (CIDS) fleet exercise guide for operational data on fleet commu-
nications� The analysis based on these data demonstrated that a CIDS concept 
for using submarines as an outer screen for aircraft carriers was infeasible� The 
fleet communications data, collected in ten fleet exercises over a two-year period 
in the late 1970s, provided the basis for the Warfare Environment Simulator, a 
simulation sponsored by Naval Electronics System Command (now the Space 
and Naval Warfare Systems Command) focused on command and control� Un-
fortunately, the Warfare Environment Simulator morphed into the Naval Warfare 
Simulation System, losing its focus on using fleet data and on command and 
control, instead becoming a large-scale campaign simulation�118
NWC war games served as the basis for developing new operational concepts 
to be explored at sea, both before World War II and during the 1980s and ’90s� 
Fleet exercises in the 1920s and ’30s turned concepts for amphibious and carrier 
air warfare and underway replenishment of naval task forces into key capabilities 
for the World War II effort� Fleet exercises in the 1980s translated operational 
concepts developed by the CNO SSGs (at the College) into capabilities to execute 
the 1980s Maritime Strategy�119 Similarly, in the 1990s, the Navy Warfare Devel-
opment Command (then collocated at the College) pursued fleet experimenta-
tion through a program called Sea Trial� However, the Navy did not sustain that 
effort� A debate exists over whether dedicated units are required to conduct such 
experimentation� The submarine force since 1949, the Navy Tactical Develop-
ment and Evaluation Program in the 1970s, and U�S� Pacific Command around 
2000 have made experimentation a matter of routine during fleet and joint exer-
cises� Data collected from routine rather than structured exercises better repre-
sents what would occur in unstructured combat and operations�
As part of war-gaming initiatives, OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services should 
reinvigorate field/fleet experimentation and embed operations analysts in de-
ployed battalions and carrier strike groups and on higher-echelon staffs to collect 
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data on operations and exercises� For large programs and issues, exercise and 
operations analysis guides using conceptual processes would provide consistent 
datasets for analysis and use in pseudoexperimentation� Those educated in engi-
neering and the hard sciences are likely to perform in the field as well as or better 
than those educated in operations research curricula emphasizing mathematical 
programming (optimization) and stochastic processes�120
Cyber warfare should receive particular attention, given current challenges in 
creating operational models� Beyond Red teams, white hats should experiment 
in the field with what it would take to turn unmanned systems into kamikazes at-
tacking their host forces, for example, before making large investment decisions�
Intelligence Collection. War games also should be tied to intelligence collection 
and analysis� While military intelligence naturally tends to focus on possible ad-
versary technical capabilities (e�g�, range and accuracy of weapons), war games 
require Red teams that understand adversary planning, training, ethos, and op-
erational concepts� Similarly, war games also suggest adversary courses of ac-
tion that would create difficulty for the Blue team� Therefore, war-game findings 
should play into intelligence requirements to determine whether adversaries have 
identified and are preparing to execute such courses of action�
Campaign Analysis. Rather than using war games or large campaign models that 
require significant amounts of time to set up, rapid, focused analyses on the eve 
of war have demonstrated value in anticipating important outcomes� Shortly be-
fore each war began, Captain/Professor Wayne Hughes gave Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) students seventy-two hours to analyze the Falklands War between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina, the wars in Afghanistan, and the wars in 
Iraq� These analyses all provided results that would have been valuable to the 
commanders involved�121 The key is selecting appropriate measures for quantifi-
cation� Selecting appropriate analytical measures begins with developing an ap-
preciation for the principal factors governing outcomes, and often is not done 
well�122
What useful results reasonably can be expected from war gaming and rapid 
campaign analysis, since accurate results cannot be expected? At NPS, Hughes 
teaches the students in his joint campaign analysis course that these war-gaming 
and campaign analyses provide the following: 
• patterns of activity, both tactical and operational; the reward of new tactics 
to accompany new technology
• a focusing by decision makers and their staffs on the important things—
those most likely to influence the outcome and achieve “victory,” or whatever 
the intended outcome is
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• synthesized information about almost anything: the traffic, the places of 
concealment, the beaches, the mountain passes to block, the critical roads, or 
the vital bridges to protect or destroy; and, perhaps most important because 
it is calculable, the time to arrive on scene and the logistical support neces-
sary to sustain operations
• advice to the decision maker that is quantitative, objective, informed,  
specific—and incomplete
• unexpected side benefits; for example, in designing a warship one might dis-
cover that it is not a good idea to put too many eggs in one basket if the ship 
can be lost while performing a dangerous task123 
Observe that predicting outcomes, or even winners by some criterion, does 
not appear on the list� Hughes is a great proponent of campaign analysis and its 
value—if one does not claim too much predictive power from it� Decisions have 
to be made amid uncertainty, and informed decisions are better than those based 
on individual experience and personal predilections alone�124
Simple versus Large Combat Models. Good analysis derives from understanding 
those few essential features of the subject under study that govern an outcome�125 
Although using models to understand essential features is valuable, attempting 
to predict outcomes by adding ever more detail without considering the impli-
cations for additional uncertainty is antithetical to analysis� Campaign analyses 
and manual war games employing simple, focused combat models and rules that 
are understood and subject to question by all participants can expose the factors 
that govern success—i�e�, those on which commanders and capability developers 
should focus�
Barring a more exact method for quantifying the uncertainty of a combat 
simulation, the analyst should estimate the typical error involved in the variables 
used in the models, multiply that times the square root of the number of vari-
ables, and present and report the result as the range of uncertainty in the quan-
titative findings� Although simulations are of great value in providing insights to 
analysts, analysts should be appropriately humble in recommending program or 
policy changes solely on the basis of the outcomes of their models�
Complexity Sciences. Advances in complexity sciences raise questions regarding 
current combat models and present new opportunities for defense analyses� The 
combat models used in war gaming and campaign simulations were developed 
before more recent improvements in understanding chaos and complexity� Chaos 
involves sensitivity to initial conditions on a space of measure zero� In a space of 
measure zero, no matter how precise an interval, area, or n-dimensional volume 
around an initial state, there exist points that will result in far different future 
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states of the system� A pendulum hung amid three magnets—such as Clause-
witz described in explaining the pulls of government (reason), the population 
(primordial violence), and the military (chance) in war—is such a chaotic sys-
tem� Classical physics and statistics, as discussed above, presume that describ-
ing the initial state allows prediction of future states, at least with probabilities� 
The foundations for statistics on spaces of measure zero are not well understood� 
Mathematics based on continuity does not apply in chaotic and in many complex 
systems�
Complexity involves power laws� Power laws have a mean, but unlike Poisson 
or Gaussian distributions, their standard distribution is infinity�126 The law of 
large numbers does not apply to power laws� Power laws apply to phenomena 
such as earthquakes—and to much of human behavior that involves bursts of 
activity�127 Historically, a small number of pilots and submarine commanders ac-
count for the most kills� Is this a power law? If so, how do combat models account 
for the distribution of talent among pilots and commanders? More broadly, how 
many events treated statistically in combat/campaign simulation involve chaotic 
and complex phenomena that make Monte Carlo processes and Markov assump-
tions inappropriate?
Warfare is renowned for extended periods of boredom followed by bursts of 
intense activity during battle� The outcome of battles is determined by tens to 
107 motivated agents performing individual functions that are more difficult to 
represent than molecules in a liquid or gas� Agent-based models involve agents 
executing rules based on the local information they have� These models are 
known for demonstrating emergent behavior, such as the collapse of a line of 
troops when adjacent soldiers retreat�128
Fundamental features of warfare suggest chaos and complexity sciences 
may be more fruitful for understanding underlying phenomena than current 
models�129
History, Cognitive and Social Sciences, and Artificial Intelligence. The cycle of 
research for war gaming and combat/campaign simulation also extends to study-
ing history and developments in social science, including experimental gaming 
on human behavior (such as in behavioral economics) and cognitive science 
studying developments in understanding the brain, etc�, to explore human rea-
soning and dynamics�
AI has had recent success in defeating human champions in games such as 
chess and Go, and increasingly is embedded in computers and weapons� Having 
people who understand AI on a team conducting analysis campaigns will add 
considerable value to the effort�
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Reviewing Previous Results. A final area of emphasis in a cycle of research is 
reviewing previous results�
Clearly war gaming and campaign simulations are a blend of an objective, scientific 
approach and the artistry of human designers and participants� What can be done to 
evaluate how well individual studies, or a series of mutually reinforcing games, simu-
lations, results, and conclusions have aided decision makers? One thing that is rarely 
done is to review “old” studies and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses after the 
projected future scenario year has passed� It is too much to ask, perhaps, for an evalu-
ation of the study results and conclusion and it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate any 
study’s impact on decisions it was to have enlightened�130
An objective examination of the scenario, the Red and Blue forces available, 
and the Red and Blue force combat capabilities after the fact can consider how 
well the study anticipated reality�131 Independent review of key features of the 
analysis will contribute to objectivity and rigor and help to identify analytical 
techniques appropriate to the subject matter�
The extent to which pseudoexperiments, whether war games or combat/ 
campaign simulations, are scientific depends wholly on the character of their 
execution� “Electronic computers, game-theoretic models, and statistical for-
mulas are but instruments after all; it is not they that produce scientific results 
but the investigator who uses them�”132 Neither type of simulation is inherently 
more scientific than the other� The principal difference is that combat/campaign 
simulation is analytical—reducing the problem to constituent pieces—while war 
gaming emphasizes synthesis—ensuring all relevant factors are considered, in-
cluding how they work together�
War gaming and large-scale computer-based combat/campaign simulation 
differ little in their inability to predict quantitative outcomes� The scientific value 
of the pseudoexperiment lies in the objectivity, rigor, and usefulness of the theory 
the pseudoexperiment represents� This includes the motivations, tastes and be-
liefs, and expertise of all the participants, including the client�
War gaming has a record of anticipating factors that largely govern outcomes, 
thus preventing surprise� Because DoD has used combat/campaign simulation 
for quantitative prediction, its performance at comparing quantitative results of 
combat models with actual combat has been less accurate and less reliable than 
that of war gaming that explored the processes and nonquantitative features that 
would affect a campaign most� Whereas those commanding and conducting op-
erations rarely have the motivation and skills to become deeply involved in com-
bat/campaign modeling, they can make the time and do have the skills to par-
ticipate in war gaming� Repeated war gaming can provide firsthand experiences 
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to limit surprise and facilitate recognitive decision making that allows rapid 
adaptation to emerging situations�
Using governing factors uncovered through war gaming, detailed computer 
models, campaign analyses, or other techniques to create simple models of the 
phenomena requires much more analytical skill than adding detailed models 
of additional processes to existing computer models� Simpler models provide 
greater understanding with appropriate precision than complicated computer 
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Returning to the roots of operations research—observing, modeling opera-
tions, and collecting data in the field—is an essential aspect of a cycle of research� 
Work in the field yields data and knowledge that increase understanding of which 
concepts actually work and which do not, and provides essential data for use in 
computer and war-gaming simulation�
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